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Whatever one thinks about the relevance or irrelevance
of entity concepts, one must acknowledge that corporations
present an anomaly to every known legal system. One basis
of the anomaly lies in the fact that lawmakers have always
written laws in contemplation of individual human beings
as the subjects of their commands. This is true not only of
the decalogue of Moses (Thou shalt not commit adultery),
and the U.S. constitution (No person shall be deprived of
life ... ), but even of twentieth century economic laws, of
which the principal violators are c;_ertain to be corporations.
In the Securities Act of 1933 the criminal penalties are
visited only on those who violate "wilfully" (a very human
characteristic), and they consist of imprisonment (which is
impossible for a corporation) and of a fine of $5,000 (which
is ridiculously small for a corporation). For a great many
corporate registrants, the fine is less than the registration
fees, to say nothing of the lawyers' fees and brokers' commissions.
The anomaly has existed as long as corporations have
been known. It gave r.ise to a chapter in the Digest of Justinian on how corporations should sue and be sued in a
procedural system designed primarily for individuals. The
anomaly has become progressively more troublesome as
corporations have become more and more dominant in all
phases of life. Business corporations in 1970 transacted
about 85 percent of all business, and nonbusiness corporations conducted a very large though incalculable fraction of religious, educational, health and recreational activities.
Jurists have responded in many ways to the challenge of
applying the individualistic precepts of legislation and
jurisprudence to corporate behavior.
In some situations, they abandoned any attempt to fit the
corporate subject in the individualistic bed. Pope Innocent
IV noted the impossibility of applying excommunication-the routine sanction of ecclesiastical
justice-to corporations. Coke noted a number of other incompatibilities when he said that corporations "may not
commit treason, nor be outlawed, nor excommunicate, for
they have no souls, neither can they appear in person, but

by attorney .... A corporation aggregate of many cannot do
fealty .. . it is not subject to imbecillities or death of the
natural body, and divers other cases.... " This solution
persists today with regard to imprisonment; although corporations are often adjudged guilty of imprisonable
offenses, judges pass over the imprisonment penalty
without even a comment.
In some other situations, judges have refused to grant corporations rights which are granted to individuals on the
ground that the lawmaker had no intent to benefit corporations. A classic instance in U.S. constitutional law is the
holding that a corporation is not entitled to the "privileges
and immunities" of citizens. Justices Black and Doublas
stubbornly insisted that the fourteenth amendment
guarantees of life, liberty, property and equal protection
should not be applied to corporations, since they were
clearly outside the contemplation of the amendment's
draftsmen and ratifiers.
On a broad front, however, judges have applied very
broadly to corporations the same rights and duties which
they had previously applied to individuals. In the Yearbook
cases, it was generally assumed that religious and
municipal corporations could receive and convey property.
That is what made it important to know whether the claimant was a corporation. A universal canon of construction
declares that corporations are comprised when "persons"
are designated. An elaborate imagery has been evolved to
determine whether corporations are "inhabitants" or
"residents" or "present" for purposes of venue. Even when
the legislative categories fit very oddly on corporate subjects, jurists have found means of forcing the corporations
within the pigeon-holes.
Moreover, draftsmen of legal documents are finally
learning to think about corpora tions, as well as about rugged individuals, when they write laws. The Constitution's
grant of jurisdiction of suits "between citizens of different
states" has been supplemented by a provision that a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of the state by which it
was incorporated and also of the state in which it has its
principal place of business. In international treaties it is
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usual to provide that companies as well as individuals are
included in the assurance of equal treatment for foreigners.
The European Economic Community Treaty provides that
"companies ... formed in accordance with the law of a
member state . . . shall ... be treated in the same way as
natural persons.... " The West German constitution of 1949
gave domestic corporations the same rights and duties as individuals.
But the number of legislative texts in which the position
of corporations is stated is very small, and was formerly
even smaller. Jurists have had to decide for themselves

portant fact about corporations is that they are composed of
people. People organized in corporations have a somewhat
different aspect than people acting individually, chiefly
because the benefits and burdens and powers of decision
are so dissipated among the members of the group When
General Motors sues or is sued for a million dollars, it is
hard to have any feeling of certainty about who is about to
be helped, hurt, corrected, or vindicated. It is nevertheless
true that each such suit has some effect on the investors, or
the employees, or the customers of the enterprise.
For this reason, the jurists of the Roman Empire, the
canonical contemporaries of Innocent IV, the 15th century
English justices, and the United States Supreme Court
justices of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries

:
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whether to apply to a corporation a law, or a principle of
law, which speaks of individuals; and, if so, how. Repeatedly they have sought to find the answer, or to justify the
answer they have found, by an inquiry into the nature of the
corporation. Is it real or fictitious? Is it merely another
name for its members, or is it something distinguishable
from its members.
There is no answer that will satisfy all, because a corporation is as diverse as an elephant, and will always have
different meanings to different observers. To Herman
Kahn, .writing on the "Future of the Corporation," corporations appeared as the monster that preempts most of
the nation's productive resources, and spews out its
capricious variety of goods and services. By Peter Drucker,
exploiting "The Concept of the Corporation," the corporation was viewed as a managerial hierarchy, whose lines of
internal selection, promotion, influence and command
determined the productivity of the organization. For
Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means, analyzing "The Modern
Corporation," corporations were forms of private
ownership which had lost both their privacy and their
owners.
All these views have validity, and all are useful in
deciding some of the questions which corporations present
to the legal system. They do not, however, cast great light on
the more routine questions of how corporations should be
fitted into a juridical order whose sentences speak of individual human beings. For these questions, the most im-
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were wise in deciding that corporations could sue and be
sued, could receive and convey property, could have access
to federal courts, and could claim the protection of due
process of law, even if their reasons were sometimes unexpressed, inconsistent, or fictional. To decide otherwise
would be to penalize those individuals who choose to pool
their labors and resources to accomplish objectives which
individuals cannot accomplish by themselves.
There is no inherent obstacle to recognizing groups as the
holders of rights. Rights to possess property, and duties to
compensate for outrage, may have belonged to families and
tribes before they belonged to individuals. In classic Roman
law, the rights and duties were assigned to the family
head-the pater familias-but they continued to benefit
and burden the members collectively. However, the assignment of rights and duties to the family head permitted the
formulation of law in the individual precepts to which we
have become accustomed. Individualization has also been
furthered by the association of secular law with canon law
and moral principles, which are concerned with the individual soul.
In modern times, as family solidarity has declined and
the industrial revolution has demanded larger economic
units, the individuality of property ownership and debtbearing has become less and less practical. Individuals
have had to unite their resources and their labor in industrial corpora tions for economic purposes, in incorporated parties for political purposes, and in incorporated
churches for religious purposes. It is through these and
similar organizations that modern humans attain most of
their economic and cultural objectives.

It would be fatuous to say that these corporations, in
which moderns live and move and have their being, are fictional. But, as Timberg pointed out, there have been many
fictions about corporations. It was a ficti.on to say that a corporation was a "citizen," or that it "resided" in a particular
judicial district, or that it "wilfully" violated the Securities
Act. If person means "individual human being," it is a fiction to say that a corporation is a person.

combine some part of their objectives. To ignore the interests which people seek to advance by these combined efforts would point the way back to a world of patriarchal
enterprise, education and religion. If the law is to protect
the activities to which a large majority of humans devote
their lives, it must deal with corporations.
In the wake of an organizational revolution, corporations
are the instruments through which contemporary humans
serve one another, and through which they satisfy their
private wants, from automobiles to religion. If we
remember that cities and school districts are also corporations, we can say the same of many public wants.
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It is equally vacuous to say that a corporation is "invisible." It is true that one cannot see General Motors all at·
once, but neither can one see Los Angeles all at once; yet
both are very visible. Nor can one see both sides of an individual at once, nor the family and property relationships
with which the law deals when the individual stands before
the court.
We should also discard as manifestly false the hoary
assertion that a corporation exists only in contemplation of
law. It is true that the state may refuse to grant it the most
elemental rights, as the Supreme Court denied the rights of
Dred Scott, and the Code Napoleon deprived certain felons
of all civil rights, declaring them "civilly dead." Although
the law ceased to contemplate them, Dred Scott and the
prototypes of Jean Valjean continued to exist. Legislatures
have occasionally decreed that a corporation should "cease
to exist" when it failed to pay its taxes, but this is a mere
play on words. Experience reveals that corporations continue to buy and sell and pay federal income taxes after
they have "ceased to exist" under state law; the state
recognizes the fact by retroactively validating their transactions when they are reinstated. As the French jurists have
put it, there is a moral existence which may precede and
may follow juridical existence.
When these paradoxes about corporate existence are laid
aside, we are free to think about corporations as enterprises
whereby humans combine some part of their resourses to

Our thought patterns remain far behind the facts of our
social life. This may be because so much of our literature is
based on a more individualistic state of society, or because
of the greater simplicity of thinking about individual actions
and reactions. Perhaps we suppress our consciousness of
corporations because they are the instruments through
which we are obliged to surrender our labors and our
money to the convenience of our human fellows. Whatever
the reason may be, we tend to speak and think in terms of
individual rights and duties, rather than of corporate ones.
Judges must, however, respond to the realities of an
organized world, even if armed largely with individualistic
statutes and doctrines. They have been resourceful in finding ways of imposing some corporate debts on corporate
members, in admitting corporations to courts under a clause
which speaks only of "citizens," and in accomplishing other
necessary ends. Venerable maxims about the invisibility
and the fictionality of corporations have clouded their explanations, but have not completely blocked their progress.
By the middle of the twentieth century, judges had largely
emancipated themselves from the bondage of these ideas,
and were prepared to solve corporate problems in the light
of the functions to be served.
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